Counter-terrorism

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Yamam, Israel's counter-terrorism unit.
Coast Guard on counter-terrorism patrol in Upper New York Bay. Verrazano-Narrows Bridge in distance spanning The Narrows between Brooklyn (left) and Staten Island (right).

Counter-terrorism (also spelled counterterrorism) incorporates the practice, tactics, techniques, and strategies that governments, militaries, police departments and corporations adopt to attack terrorist threats and/or acts, both real and imputed.

The tactic of terrorism is available to insurgents and governments. Not all insurgents use terror as a tactic, and some choose not to use it because other tactics work better for them in a particular context. Individuals, such as Timothy McVeigh, may also engage in terrorist acts such as the Oklahoma City bombing.

If the terrorism is part of a broader insurgency, counter-terrorism may also form a part of a counter-insurgency doctrine, but political, economic, and other measures may focus more on the insurgency than the specific acts of terror. Foreign internal defense (FID) is a term used by the United States military for programs supporting other nations in their attempts either to suppress insurgency, lawlessness or subversion or reduce the conditions under which these threats to security could develop. Counter-terrorism includes both the detection of potential acts and the response to related events.

History[edit]

Special Branch detectives on an undercover operation at the London Docks, 1911.

In response to the escalating terror campaign in Britain carried out by the militant Irish Fenians in the 1880s, the first counterterrorism unit ever was established by the Home Secretary, Sir William Harcourt. The Special Irish Branch was initially formed as a section of the Criminal Investigation Department of the London Metropolitan Police in 1883, to combat Irish republican terrorism through infiltration and subversion.

Harcourt envisioned a permanent unit dedicated to the prevention of politically motivated violence through the use of modern techniques such as undercover infiltration. This pioneering branch was the first to be trained in counter-terrorism techniques.[1]

Its name was changed to Special Branch as it had its remit gradually expanded to incorporate a general role in counter-terrorism, combating foreign subversion and infiltrating organized crime. Law enforcement agencies, in Britain and elsewhere, established similar units.[2] Counter-terrorism forces were expanded with the growing threat of terrorism in the late 20th century.

Planning[edit]

Most counter-terrorism strategies involve an increase in standard police and domestic intelligence. The central activities are traditional: interception of communications, and the tracing of persons. New technology has, however, expanded the range of military and law enforcement operations.

United States Customs and Border Protection officers, fully armed and armored for a counter-terrorism operation

Domestic intelligence is often directed at specific groups, defined on the basis of origin or religion, which is a source of political controversy. Mass surveillance of an entire population raises objections on civil liberties grounds. Homegrown terrorists, especially lone wolves are often harder to detect because of their citizenship or legal alien status and ability to stay under the radar.

To select the effective action when terrorism appears to be more of an isolated event, the appropriate government organizations need to understand the source, motivation, methods of preparation, and tactics of terrorist groups. Good intelligence is at the heart of such preparation, as well as political and social understanding of any grievances that might be solved. Ideally, one gets information from inside the group, a very difficult challenge for HUMINT because operational terrorist cells are often small, with all members known to one another, perhaps even related.[3]

Counterintelligence is a great challenge with the security of cell-based systems, since the ideal, but nearly impossible, goal is to obtain a clandestine source within the cell. Financial tracking can play a role, as can communications intercept, but both of these approaches need to be balanced against legitimate expectations of privacy.

Legal contexts[edit]

In response to the growing legislation.

United Kingdom
United States
Australia
Israel

Human rights[edit]

John Walker Lindh was captured as an enemy combatant during the United States' 2001 invasion of Afghanistan.

One of the primary difficulties of implementing effective counter-terrorist measures is the waning of civil liberties and individual privacy that such measures often entail, both for citizens of, and for those detained by states attempting to combat terror. At times, measures designed to tighten security have been seen as abuses of power or even violations of human rights.

Examples of these problems can include prolonged, incommunicado detention without judicial review; risk of subjecting to torture during the transfer, return and extradition of people between or within countries; and the adoption of security measures that restrain the rights or freedoms of citizens and breach principles of non-discrimination.[5] Examples include:

Many would argue that such violations exacerbate rather than counter the terrorist threat.[5] Human rights advocates argue for the crucial role of human rights protection as an intrinsic part to fight against terrorism.[6] This suggests, as proponents of human security have long argued, that respecting human rights may indeed help us to incur security. Amnesty International included a section on confronting terrorism in the recommendations in the Madrid Agenda arising from the Madrid Summit on Democracy and Terrorism (Madrid 8–11 March 2005):

Democratic principles and values are essential tools in the fight against terrorism. Any successful strategy for dealing with terrorism requires terrorists to be isolated. Consequently, the preference must be to treat terrorism as criminal acts to be handled through existing systems of law enforcement and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law. We recommend: (1) taking effective measures to make impunity impossible either for acts of terrorism or for the abuse of human rights in counter-terrorism measures. (2) the incorporation of human rights laws in all anti-terrorism programmes and policies of national governments as well as international bodies."[6]

While international efforts to combat terrorism have focused on the need to enhance cooperation between states, proponents of human rights (as well as human security) have suggested that more effort needs to be given to the effective inclusion of human rights protection as a crucial element in that cooperation. They argue that international human rights obligations do not stop at borders and a failure to respect human rights in one state may undermine its effectiveness in the international effort to cooperate to combat terrorism.[5]

Preemptive neutralization[edit]

Some countries see preemptive attacks as a legitimate strategy. This includes capturing, killing, or disabling suspected terrorists before they can mount an attack. Israel, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia have taken this approach, while Western European states generally do not.

Another major method of preemptive neutralization is interrogation of known or suspected terrorists to obtain information about specific plots, targets, the identity of other terrorists, whether or not the interrogation subjects himself is guilty of terrorist involvement. Sometimes more extreme methods are used to increase suggestibility, such as sleep deprivation or drugs. Such methods may lead captives to offer false information in an attempt to stop the treatment, or due to the confusion brought on by it. These methods are not tolerated by European powers. In 1978 the European Court of Human Rights ruled in the Ireland v. United Kingdom case that such methods amounted to a practice of inhuman and degrading treatment, and that such practices were in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights Article 3 (art. 3).

Non-military[edit]

The human security paradigm outlines a non-military approach which aims to address the enduring underlying inequalities which fuel terrorist activity. Causal factors need to be delineated and measures implemented which allow equal access to resources and sustainability for all people. Such activities empower citizens providing 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'.

This can take many forms including the provision of clean drinking water, education, vaccination programs, provision of food and shelter and protection from violence, military or otherwise. Successful human security campaigns have been characterized by the participation of a diverse group of actors including governments, NGOs, and citizens.

Foreign internal defense programs provide outside expert assistance to a threatened government. FID can involve both non-military and military aspects of counter-terrorism.

Another preventative action that has been used is the threat of and use of pork and pork products against radical religious groups that feel that contact with pork will render them unclean. The bodies of killed terrorists are daubed with lard and buried wrapped in pigskin.[7]

Military[edit]

U.S. Marines in Afghanistan

Terrorism has often been used to justify military intervention in countries like Pakistan where terrorists are said to be based. That was the main stated justification for the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. It was also a stated justification for the second Russian invasion of Chechnya.

Military intervention has not always been successful in stopping or preventing future terrorism, like during the Malayan Emergency, the Mau Mau Uprising, and most of the campaigns against the IRA during the Irish Civil War, the S-Plan, the Border Campaign (IRA) and the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Although military action can disrupt a terrorist group's operations temporarily, it sometimes doesn't end the threat completely.[8]

Thus repression by the military in itself (particularly if it is not accompanied by other measures) usually leads to short term victories, but tend to be unsuccessful in the long run (e.g. the French's doctrine described in Roger Trinquier's book Modern War[9] used in Indochina and Algeria). However, new methods (see the new Counterinsurgency Field Manual[10]) such as those taken in Iraq have yet to be seen as beneficial or ineffectual.

Preparation[edit]

Police, fire, and emergency medical response organizations have obvious roles. Local firefighters and emergency medical personnel (often called "first responders") have plans for mitigating the effects of terrorist attacks, although police may deal with threats of such attacks.

Target-hardening[edit]

Whatever the target of terrorists, there are multiple ways of hardening the targets to prevent the terrorists from hitting their mark, or reducing the damage of attacks. One method is to place Jersey Barrier or other sturdy obstacles outside tall or politically sensitive buildings to prevent car and truck bombing.

Aircraft cockpits are kept locked during flights, and have reinforced doors, which only the pilots in the cabin are capable of opening. UK railway stations removed their rubbish bins in response to the Provisional IRA threat, as convenient locations for depositing bombs.

Scottish stations removed theirs after the 7th of July bombing of London as a precautionary measure. The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority purchased bomb-resistant barriers after the September 11 terrorist attacks.

A more sophisticated target-hardening approach must consider industrial and other critical industrial infrastructure that could be attacked. Terrorists need not import chemical weapons if they can cause a major industrial accident such as the Bhopal disaster or the Halifax Explosion. Industrial chemicals in manufacturing, shipping, and storage need greater protection, and some efforts are in progress.[11] To put this risk into perspective, the first major lethal chemical attack in WWI used 160 tons of chlorine. Industrial shipments of chlorine, widely used in water purification and the chemical industry, travel in 90 or 55 ton tank cars.

To give one more example, the North American electrical grid has already demonstrated, in the Northeast Blackout of 2003, its vulnerability to natural disasters coupled with inadequate, possibly insecure, SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) networks. Part of the vulnerability is due to deregulation leading to much more interconnection in a grid designed for only occasional power-selling between utilities. A small number of terrorists, attacking key power facilities when one or more engineers have infiltrated the power control centers, could wreak havoc.

Equipping likely targets with containers (i.e., bags) of pig lard has been utilized to discourage attacks by Islamist suicide bombers. The technique was apparently used on a limited scale by British authorities in the 1940s.[12] The approach stems from the idea that Muslims perpetrating the attack would not want to be "soiled" by the lard in the moment prior to dying. The idea has been suggested more recently as a deterrent to suicide bombings in Israel.[13] However, the actual effectiveness of this tactic is probably limited as it is possible that a sympathetic Islamic scholar could issue a fatwa proclaiming that a suicide bomber would not be polluted by the swine products.

Command and control[edit]

In North America and other continents, for a threatened or completed terrorist attack, the Incident Command System (ICS) is apt to be invoked to control the various services that may need to be involved in the response. ICS has varied levels of escalation, such as might be needed for multiple incidents in a given area (e.g., the 2005 bombings in London or the 2004 Madrid train bombings, or all the way to a National Response Plan invocation if national-level resources are needed. National response, for example, might be needed for a nuclear, biological, radiological, or large chemical attack.

Damage mitigation[edit]

Fire departments, perhaps supplemented by public works agencies, utility providers (e.g., gas, water, electricity), and heavy construction contractors, are most apt to deal with the physical consequences of an attack.

Local security[edit]

Again under an incident command model, local police can isolate the incident area, reducing confusion, and specialized police units can conduct tactical operations against terrorists, often using specialized counter-terrorist tactical units. Bringing in such units will normally involve civil or military authority beyond the local level.

Medical services[edit]

Emergency medical services will bring the more seriously affected victims to hospitals, which will need to have mass casualty and triage plans in place.

Public health agencies, from local to national level, may be designated to deal with identification, and sometimes mitigation, of possible biological attacks, and sometimes chemical or radiologic contamination.

Tactical units[edit]

Royal Malaysia Police Pasukan Gerakan Khas officers

Today, many countries have special units designated to handle terrorist threats. Besides various security agencies, there are elite tactical units, also known as special mission units, whose role is to directly engage terrorists and prevent terrorist attacks.

Such units perform both in preventive actions, hostage rescue and responding to on-going attacks. Countries of all sizes can have highly trained counter-terrorist teams. Tactics, techniques and procedures for manhunting are under constant development.

Most of these measures deal with terrorist attacks that affect an area, or threaten to do so. It is far harder to deal with assassination, or even reprisals on individuals, due to the short (if any) warning time and the quick exfiltration of the assassins.[14]

These units are specially trained in tactics and are very well equipped for CQB with emphasis on stealth and performing the mission with minimal casualties. The units include take-over force (assault teams), snipers, EOD experts, dog handlers and intelligence officers. See Counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism organizations for national command, intelligence, and incident mitigation.

The majority of counter-terrorism operations at the tactical level, are conducted by state, federal and national law enforcement agencies or intelligence agencies. In some countries, the military may be called in as a last resort. Obviously, for countries whose military are legally permitted to conduct police operations, this is a non-issue, and such counter-terrorism operations are conducted by their military.

See counter-intelligence for command, intelligence and warning, and incident mitigation aspects of counter-terror.

Examples of actions[edit]

Some counterterrorist actions of the 20th and 21st century are listed below. See list of hostage crises for a more extended list, including hostage-taking that did not end violently.

Representative hostage rescue operations
IncidentMain localeHostage nationalityKidnappers
/hijackers
Counter-terrorist forceResults
1972Munich MassacreMunich Olympics, GermanyIsraeliBlack SeptemberIsraeli Mossad, German policeAll hostages murdered, 5 kidnappers killed. 3 kidnappers captured and released.
1975AIA Hostage IncidentAIA building, Kuala Lumpur, MalaysiaMixed. US and SwedishJapanese Red ArmySpecial Actions UnitAll hostages rescued, all kidnappers flown to Libya.
1976Entebbe raidEntebbe, UgandaIsraelis and Jews. Non-Jewish hostages were released shortly after capture.PFLPSayeret Matkal, Sayeret Tzanhanim, Sayeret GolaniAll 6 hijackers, 45 Ugandan troops, 3 hostages and 1 Israeli soldier dead. 100 hostages rescued
1977Hijacking of Lufthansa Flight 181Spanish airspace and Mogadishu, SomaliaMixedPFLPGSG 9, Special Air Service consultants1 hostage, 3 hijackers dead, 1 captured. 90 hostages rescued.
1980Iranian Embassy SiegeLondon, UKMostly Iranian but some BritishDemocratic Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of ArabistanSpecial Air Service1 hostage, 5 kidnappers dead, 1 captured. 24 hostages rescued. 1 SAS operative received minor burns.
1981Hijacking of "Woyla" Garuda IndonesiaDon Muang International Airport, ThailandIndonesianJihad CommandKopassus, RTAF mixed forces1 hijacker killed himself, 4 hijackers and 1 Kopassus operative dead, 1 pilot wounded, all hostages rescued.
1983Turkish embassy attackLisbon, PortugalTurkishArmenian Revolutionary ArmyGOE5 hijackers, 1 hostage and 1 policeman dead, 1 hostage and 1 policeman wounded.
1985Capture of Achille Lauro hijackersInternational airspace and ItalyMixedPLOUS military, turned over to Italy1 dead in hijacking, 4 hijackers convicted in Italy
1986Pudu Prison siegePudu Prison, Kuala Lumpur, MalaysiaTwo doctorsPrisonersSpecial Actions Unit6 kidnappers captured, 2 hostages rescued
1993Operation AshwamedhAmritsar,India141 passengersIslamic terrorist(Mohammed Yousuf Shah)NSG commandos3 hijackers killed,all hostages rescued
1996Japanese embassy hostage crisisLima, PeruJapanese and guests (800+)Túpac Amaru Revolutionary MovementPeruvian military & police mixed forces1 hostage, 2 rescuers, all 14 kidnappers dead.
2000Sauk Arms HeistPerak, MalaysiaMalaysian (2 policemen, 1 soldier and 1 civilian)Al-Ma'unahGrup Gerak Khas and 20 policemen from the Pasukan Gerakan Khas, mixed forces2 hostages dead, 2 rescuers dead, 1 kidnapper dead and the other 28 kidnappers captured.
2002Moscow theater hostage crisisMoscowMixed, mostly Russian (900+)ChechenRussian spetsnaz129-204 hostages dead, all 39 kidnappers dead. 600-700 hostages freed.
2004Beslan school hostage crisisBeslan, North Ossetia-Alania, (an autonomous republic in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation).RussianChechenMixed Russian334 hostages dead and hundreds wounded. 10-21 rescuers dead. 31 kidnappers killed, 1 captured.
2007Lal Masjid siegeIslamabad, PakistanPakistani studentsLal Masjid students and militantsPakistani Army and Rangers SSG commandos61 militants killed, 50 militants captured, 23 students killed, 11 SSG killed,1 Ranger killed,33 SSG wounded,8 soldiers wounded,3 Rangers wounded, 14 civilians killed
2007Kirkuk Hostage RescueKirkuk, IraqTurkman childIslamic State of Iraq Al QaedaPUK's Kurdistan Regional Government's CTG Counter Terrorism Group5 kidnappers arrested, 1 hostage rescued
2008Operation JaqueColombiaMixedRevolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia15 hostages released. 2 kidnappers captured
2008Operations DawnGulf of Aden, SomaliaMixedSomalian piracy and militantsPASKAL and international mixed forcesNegotiation finished. 80 hostages released. RMN including PASKAL navy commandos with international mixed forces patrolling the Gulf of Aden during this festive period.[15][16][17]
20082008 Mumbai attacksMultiple locations in Mumbai cityIndian Nationals, Foreign touristsAjmal Qasab and other Pakistani nationals affiliated to Laskar-e-taiba300 NSG commandos, 36-100 Marine commandos and 400 army Para Commandos141 Indian civilians, 30 foreigners, 15 policemen and two NSG commandos were killed.

9 attackers killed,1 attacker captured and 293 injured

20092009 Lahore AttacksMultiple locations in Lahore cityPakistanLaskar-e-taiba or LeTPolice Commandos, Army Rangers BattalionMarch 3, The Sri Lankan cricket team attack - 6 members of the Sri Lankan cricket team were injured, 6 Pakistani policemen and 2 civilians killed.[citation needed]

March 30, the Manawan Police Academy in Lahore attack - 8 gunmen, 8 police personnel and 2 civilians killed, 95 people injured, 4 gunmen captured.[citation needed].
Plaza Cinema Chowk attack - 16 policemen, an army officer and unknown number of civilians killed. As many as 251 people injured.[citation needed]

2012Lopota Gorge hostage crisisLopota Gorge, GeorgiaGeorgiansethnic Chechen, Russian and Georgian militantsSpecial Operations Center, SOD, KUD and army special forces2 KUD members and one special forces corpsman killed, 5 policemen wounded, 11 kidnappers killed, 5 wounded and 1 captured. All hostages rescued.
20132013 Lahad Datu standoffLahad Datu, Sabah, MalaysiaMalaysiansRoyal Security Forces of the Sultanate of Sulu and North BorneoMalaysian Armed Forces, Royal Malaysia Police, Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency and joint special forces as well as Philippines forces2 PGK members, 8 policemen and one soldier killed, 12 others wounded, 67 militants killed, 3 wounded and 149 captured. All hostages rescued. 2 civilians killed and one wounded.

Designing Anti-terrorism systems[edit]

The scope for Anti-terrorism systems is very large in physical terms (long borders, vast areas, high traffic volumes in busy cities, etc.) as well as in other dimensions, such as type and degree of terrorism threat, political and diplomatic ramifications, and legal issues. In this environment, the development of a persistent Anti-terrorism protection system is a daunting task. Such a system should bring together diverse state-of-the-art technologies to enable persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions, and enable potential actions. Designing such a system-of-systems comprises a major technological project.

A particular design problem for this system is that it will face many uncertainties in the future. The threat of terrorism may increase, decrease or remain the same, the type of terrorism and location are difficult to predict, and there are technological uncertainties. Yet we want to design a terrorism system conceived and designed today in order to prevent acts of terrorism for a decade or more. A potential solution is to incorporate flexibility into system design for the reason that the flexibility embedded can be exercised in future as uncertainty unfolds and updated information arrives. And the design and valuation of a protection system should not be based on a single scenario, but an array of scenarios. Flexibility can be incorporated in the design of the terrorism system in the form of options that can be exercised in the future when new information is available. Using these ‘real options’ will create a flexible Anti-terrorism system that is able to cope with new requirements that may arise.[18]

Law enforcement/Police[edit]

While some countries with longstanding terrorism problems, such as Israel, have law enforcement agencies primarily designed to prevent and respond to terror attacks,[19] in other nations, counter-terrorism is a relatively more recent objective of civilian police and law enforcement agencies.[20][21]

While some civil-libertarians and criminal justice scholars have called-out efforts of law enforcement agencies to combat terrorism as futile and expensive[22] or as threats to civil liberties,[22] other scholars have begun describing and analyzing the most important dimensions of the policing of terrorism as an important dimension of counterterrorism, especially in the post-9/11 era, and have argued how police institutions view terrorism as a matter of crime control.[20] Such analyses bring out the civilian police role in counterterrorism next to the military model of a 'war on terror'.[23]

Counter-Terrorism and American Law Enforcement[edit]

Pursuant to passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, federal, state and local law enforcement administrators began to systemically reorganize.[24][25] Two primary federal derpatments (the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)) house most of the federal agencies that are prepared to combat domestic and international terrorist attacks. These include: Border Patrol, The Secret Service, The Coast Guard and the FBI.

Following suit from federal changes pursuant to 9/11, however, most state and local law enforcement agencies began to include a commitment to "fighting terrorism" in their mission statements.[26][27] Local agencies began to establish more patterned lines of communication with federal agencies. Some scholars have doubted the ability of local police to help in the war on terror and suggest their limited manpower is still best utilized by engaging community and targeting street crimes.[28]

While counter-terror measures (most notably heightened airport security, immigrant profiling[29] and border patrol) have been adapted during the last decade, to enhance counter-terror in law enforcement, there have been remarkable limitations to assessing the actual utility/effectiveness of law enforcement practices that are ostensibly preventative.[30] Thus, while sweeping changes in counter-terrorism rhetoric redefined most American post 9/11 law enforcement agencies in theory, it is hard to assess how well such hyperbole has translated into practice.

In intelligence-led policing(ILP) efforts, the most quantitatively amenable starting point for measuring the effectiveness of any policing strategy (i.e.: Neighborhood Watch, Gun Abatement, Foot Patrols, etc.) is usually to assess total financial costs against clearance rates or arrest rates. Since terrorism is such a rare event phenomena,[31] measuring arrests or clearance rates would be a non-generalizable and ineffective way to test enforcement policy effectiveness. Another methodological problem in assessing counter-terrorism efforts in law enforcement hinges on finding operational measures for key concepts in the study of homeland security. Both terrorism and homeland security are relatively new concepts for criminologists, and academicians have yet to agree on the matter of how to properly define these ideas in a way that is accessible.

Assault car of the French GIGN.

Notable International Counter-Terrorism Agencies[edit]

+ indicates military organization allowed to operate domestically.

Military[edit]

For more details on this topic, see List of special forces units.

Given the nature of operational counter-terrorism tasks national military organizations do not generally have dedicated units whose sole responsibility is the prosecution of these tasks. Instead the counter-terrorism function is an element of the role, allowing flexibility in their employment, with operations being undertaken in the domestic or international context.

In some cases the legal framework within which they operate prohibits military units conducting operations in the domestic arena; United States Department of Defense policy, based on the Posse Comitatus Act, forbids domestic counter-terrorism operations by the U.S. military. Units allocated some operational counter-terrorism task are frequently Special Forces or similar assets.

In cases where military organisations do operate in the domestic context some form of formal handover from the law enforcement community is regularly required, to ensure adherence to the legislative framework and limitations. such as the Iranian Embassy Siege, the British police formally turned responsibility over to the Special Air Service when the situation went beyond police capabilities.

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ Aniceto Masferrer, Clive Walker (2013). Counter-Terrorism, Human Rights and the Rule of Law: Crossing Legal Boundaries in Defence of the State. Edward Elgar Publishing. p. 294. 
  2. ^ Tim Newburn, Peter Neyroud (2013). Dictionary of Policing. Routledge. p. 262. 
  3. ^ Feiler, Gil (September 2007). The Globalization of Terror Funding (PDF). Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University. p. 29. Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 74. Retrieved November 14, 2007. 
  4. ^ Summary of Israeli Supreme Court Ruling on Targeted Killings December 14, 2006
  5. ^ a b c d e f Human Rights News (2004): "Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism", in the Briefing to the 60th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights. online
  6. ^ a b c d e f g h Amnesty International (2005): "Counter-terrorism and criminal law in the EU. online
  7. ^ Philps, Alan (February 26, 2002). "Settlers use pigskin to foil the martyrs". The Daily Telegraph (London). Retrieved April 30, 2010. 
  8. ^ Pape, Robert A. (2005). Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. Random House. pp. 237–250. 
  9. ^ Trinquier, Roger (1961). "Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency". "1964 English translation by Daniel Lee with an Introduction by Bernard B. Fall" 
  10. ^ Nagl, John A.; Petraeus, David H.; Amos, James F.; Sewall, Sarah (December 2006). Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency (PDF). US Department of the Army. Retrieved February 3, 2008. "While military manuals rarely show individual authors, David Petraeus is widely described as establishing many of this volume's concepts." 
  11. ^ Weiss, Eric M. (2005-01-11). "D.C. Wants Rail Hazmats Banned: S.C. Wreck Renews Fears for Capital". The Washington Post: B01. 
  12. ^ "Suicide bombing 'pig fat threat". BBC News. 2004-02-13. Retrieved January 2, 2010. 
  13. ^ "Swine: Secret Weapon Against Islamic Terror?". ArutzSheva. 2007-12-09. 
  14. ^ Stathis N. Kalyvas (2004). "The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil Wars" (PDF). Journal of Ethics 8 (1): 97–138. doi:10.1023/B:JOET.0000012254.69088.41. 
  15. ^ Crewmen tell of scary ordeal The Star Sunday October 5, 2008.
  16. ^ No choice but to pay ransom The Star Monday September 29, 2008
  17. ^ "Ops Fajar mission accomplished". The Star. 2008-10-10. Retrieved November 7, 2008. 
  18. ^ Buurman, J.; Zhang, S.; Babovic, V. (2009). "Reducing Risk Through Real Options in Systems Design: The Case of Architecting a Maritime Domain Protection System". Risk Analysis 29 (3): 366. doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.2008.01160.x.  edit
  19. ^ Juergensmeyer, Mark (2000). Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
  20. ^ a b Deflem, Mathieu. 2010. The Policing of Terrorism: Organizational and Global Perspectives. New York: Routledge.
  21. ^ Deflem, Mathieu and Samantha Hauptman. 2013. "Policing International Terrorism." Pp. 64-72 in Globalisation and the Challenge to Criminology, edited by Francis Pakes. London: Routledge. [1]
  22. ^ a b Helms, Ronald; Costanza, S.E and Johnson, N.. 2011. “Crouching tiger or phantom dragon? Examining the discourse on global cyber-terror.” http://www.palgrave-journals.com/sj/journal/vaop/ncurrent/abs/sj20116a.html
  23. ^ Michael Bayer. 2010. The Blue Planet: Informal International Police Networks and National Intelligence. Washington, DC: National Intelligence Defense College. [2]
  24. ^ Costanza, S.E., Kilburn Jr., John C. 2005. "Symbolic Security, Moral Panic and Public Sentiment: Toward a sociology of Counterterrorism", Journal of Social and Ecological Boundaries, 1(2): 106-124
  25. ^ Deflem, M. 2004. “Social Control and the Policing of Terrorism Foundations for a sociology of Counterterrorism.” American Sociologist. 35 (2): 75-92. [3]
  26. ^ DeLone, Gregory J. 2007. “Law Enforcement Mission Statements Post September 11." Police Quarterly 10(2)
  27. ^ Mathieu Deflem. 2010. The Policing of Terrorism: Organizational and Global Perspectives. New York: Routledge.
  28. ^ Helms, Ronald; Costanza, S.E and Johnson, N. 2011. “Crouching tiger or phantom dragon? Examining the discourse on global cyber-terror.” http://www.palgrave-journals.com/sj/journal/vaop/ncurrent/abs/sj20116a.html
  29. ^ Ramirez, D., J. Hoopes, and T.L. Quinlan. 2003 “Defining racial profiling in a post-September 11 world.” American Criminal Law Review. 40(3): 1195-1233.
  30. ^ Kilburn, John C, Jr; Costanza, S.E.; Metchik, Eric and Borgeson, Kevin (2011) "Policing Terror Threats and False Positives: Employing a Signal Detection Model to Examine Changes in National and Local Policing Strategy between 2001-2007" Security Journal 24, 19–36
  31. ^ Kilburn Jr., John C. and Costanza, S.E. 2009 “Immigration and Homeland Security” published in Battleground: Immigration (Ed: Judith Ann Warner); Greenwood Publishing, Ca.

Further reading[edit]

External links[edit]