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Plato from The School of Athens by Raphael, 1509
|Allegories and metaphors|
The Analogy of the Divided Line is presented by the Greek philosopher Plato in his work The Republic Book VI (509D–513E). It is written as a dialogue between Glaucon (Plato's brother) and Socrates, narrated by the latter. Plato has Socrates explain through the literary device of a divided line his fundamental metaphysical ideas as four separate but logically connected models of the world. The four models are arranged into a first pair for the visible world, and a second pair for the purely intelligible world. The models are described in succession as corresponding to increasing levels of reality from common illusion, to belief, to reasoning, and then to philosophical understanding.
Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, and divide each of them again in the same proportion, and suppose the two main divisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible, and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of clearness, and you will find that the first section in the sphere of the visible consists of images. And by images I mean, in the first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like: Do you understand?
Yes, I understand.
Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to include the animals which we see, and everything that grows or is made.
Thus AB represents shadows and reflections of physical things, and BC the physical things themselves. These correspond to two kinds of knowledge, the illusion (εἰκασία eikasia) of our ordinary, everyday experience, and belief (πίστις pistis) about discrete physical objects which cast their shadows. In the Timaeus, the category of illusion includes all the "opinions of which the minds of ordinary people are full," while the natural sciences are included in the category of belief.
According to some translations, the segment CE, representing the intelligible world, is divided into the same ratio as AC, giving the subdivisions CD and DE (it can be readily verified that CD must have the same length as BC):
There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given by the former division as images; the enquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle descends to the other end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves (510b).
Plato describes CD, the "lower" of these, as involving mathematical reasoning (διάνοια dianoia), where abstract mathematical objects such as geometric lines are discussed. Such objects are outside the physical world (and are not to be confused with the drawings of those lines, which fall within the physical world BC). However, they are less important to Plato than the subjects of philosophical understanding (νόησις noesis), the "higher" of these two subdivisions (DE):
And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will understand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses — that is to say, as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole (511b).
Plato here is using the familiar relationship between ordinary objects and their shadows or reflections in order to illustrate the relationship between the physical world as a whole and the world of Ideas (Forms) as a whole. The former is made up of a series of passing reflections of the latter, which is eternal, more real and "true." Moreover, the knowledge that we have of the Ideas – when indeed we do have it – is of a higher order than knowledge of the mere physical world. In particular, knowledge of the forms leads to a knowledge of the Idea (Form) of the Good.
The following table summarizes the analogy of the divided line:
|Segment||Type of knowledge||Type of object|
|DE (highest)||Philosophical understanding (noesis)||Ideas (Forms), especially the Idea (Form) of the Good|
|CD||Mathematical reasoning (dianoia), including theoretical science||Abstract mathematical objects, such as numbers and lines|
|BC||Beliefs about physical things (pistis), including empirical science||Physical objects|
|AB (lowest)||Opinions, illusions (eikasia)||"Shadows" and "reflections" of physical objects|
The allegory of the Divided Line is the cornerstone of Plato's metaphysical framework. This structure, well hidden in the middle of the Republic, a complex, multi-layered dialogue, illustrates the grand picture of Plato's metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, all in one. It is not enough for the philosopher to understand the Ideas (Forms), he must also understand the relation of Ideas to all four levels of the structure to be able to know anything at all. In the Republic, the philosopher must understand the Idea of Justice to live a just life or to organize and govern a just state.
The Divided Line also serves as our guide for most past and future metaphysics. The lowest level, which represents "the world of becoming and passing away" (Republic, 508d), is the metaphysical model for a Heraclitean philosophy of constant flux and for Protagorean philosophy of appearance and opinion. The second level, a world of fixed physical objects, also became Aristotle's metaphysical model. The third level might be a Pythagorean level of mathematics. The fourth level is Plato's ideal Parmenidean reality, the world of highest level Ideas.
Plato holds a very strict notion of knowledge. For example, he does not accept expertise about a subject, nor direct perception (the Theaetetus), nor true belief about the physical world (the Meno) as knowledge. For knowledge, he also requires philosophical understanding of the relevant Ideas (Forms), as a basis for proper justification at all other levels of the Divided Line. Thus, for this reason, in most of the 'earlier, Socratic' dialogues, Socrates denies knowledge both to himself and others.
For the first level, "the world of becoming and passing away," Plato expressly denies the possibility of knowledge. Constant change never stays the same, therefore, properties of objects must refer to different Ideas at different times. Note that for knowledge to be possible, which Plato believed, the other three levels must be unchanging. The third and fourth level, mathematics and Ideas are already eternal and unchanging. However, to ensure that the second level objective, physical world is also unchanging, Plato, in the Republic, Book 4 introduces empirically derived axiomatic restrictions that prohibit both motion and shifting perspectives.