Abdul Qadeer Khan

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Abdul Qadeer Khan
HI, NI (twice)

Abdul Qadeer Khan (in grey suit, right of army officer), in 1998.
Born(1936-04-01) 1 April 1936 (age 76)
Bhopal, British Bhopal, British Indian Empire (Present day, India)
ResidenceIslamabad, Islamabad Capital Territory
FieldsMetallurgical Engineering
InstitutionsURENCO Group
Khan Research Laboratories
Physics Dynamic Laboratories
GIK Institute of Technology
Hamdard University
Gomal University
Alma materKarachi University
Technical University Berlin
Catholic University of Leuven
Delft University of Technology
Doctoral advisorMartin J. Brabers[1]
Known forAtomic deterrence programme
Ultracentrifuges development
Martensite and Morphology
Notable awardsHilal-i-Imtiaz (14 August 1989)
Nishan-e-Imtiaz (14 August 1996 and 23 March 1999
SpouseHenny Qadeer Khan
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Abdul Qadeer Khan
HI, NI (twice)

Abdul Qadeer Khan (in grey suit, right of army officer), in 1998.
Born(1936-04-01) 1 April 1936 (age 76)
Bhopal, British Bhopal, British Indian Empire (Present day, India)
ResidenceIslamabad, Islamabad Capital Territory
FieldsMetallurgical Engineering
InstitutionsURENCO Group
Khan Research Laboratories
Physics Dynamic Laboratories
GIK Institute of Technology
Hamdard University
Gomal University
Alma materKarachi University
Technical University Berlin
Catholic University of Leuven
Delft University of Technology
Doctoral advisorMartin J. Brabers[1]
Known forAtomic deterrence programme
Ultracentrifuges development
Martensite and Morphology
Notable awardsHilal-i-Imtiaz (14 August 1989)
Nishan-e-Imtiaz (14 August 1996 and 23 March 1999
SpouseHenny Qadeer Khan

Abdul Qadeer Khan[note 1] (Urdu: ڈاکٹر عبد القدیر خان‎; b. 1 April 1936); DEngr, NI (twice), HI, FPAS; also respectfully known in Pakistan as Mohsin-e-Pakistan (in Urdu: محسن پاکِستان; lit: Savior of Pakistan), more popularly known as Dr. A. Q. Khan, is a Pakistani nuclear scientist and a metallurgical engineer, colloquially regarded as the founder of HEU based Gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment programme for Pakistan's integrated atomic bomb project.[2] Founded and established the Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) in 1976, he was both its senior scientist and the director-general until his retirement in 2001, and was an early and vital figure in other science projects. Apart from participating in atomic bomb project, he made major contributions in molecular morphology, physical martensite, and its integrated applications in condensed and material physics.

Abdul Qadeer Khan was one of Pakistan's top scientists,[3] and was involved in the country's various scientific programmes until his debriefing.[3] In January 2004, Khan was officially summoned for a debriefing on his suspicious activities in other countries after the United States provided evidences to the Pakistan Government, and confessed it a month later.[3] However, it has been alleged that these activities were government sanction, though the Pakistan government sharply dismissed the claims.[4][5] After years of debriefing, the Islamabad High Court (IHC) on 6 February 2009 declared Abdul Qadeer Khan to be a free citizen of Pakistan, allowing him free movement inside the country. The verdict was rendered by Chief Justice Sardar Muhammad Aslam.[6] In September 2009, expressing concerns over the Islamabad High Court's decision to end all security restrictions on Khan, the United States warned that Khan still remains a "serious proliferation risk".[7]


Early life

Khan was born in Bhopal, India (then British Indian Empire) into a Pashtun, but Urdu-speaking family in 1936. His father Dr. Abdul Ghafoor Khan was an academic who served in the Education Ministry of the British Indian Government and after retirement in 1935, settled permanently in Bhopal State.[8] After the partition in 1947, the family emigrated from India to Pakistan, and settled in West-Pakistan.[9] Khan studied in Saint Anthony's High School of Lahore, and then enrolled at the D.J. Science College of Karachi.[9] There, he took his double BA degree in Physics and in Mathematics under the supervision of physicist Dr. Bashir Syed.[9] In 1956, he attended Karachi University and obtained a B.S. degree in Metallurgy in 1960 and subsequently got the internship at the Siemens Engineering.[9]

After the graduation, he was employed by the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation and worked as an city inspector of weight and measures in Karachi, Pakistan.[9] In 1961, he went to West Berlin to study Metallurgical engineering at the Technical University Berlin.[9] In 1967, Qadeer Khan obtained an engineer's degree in technology from Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands, and a doctorate engineering in Metallurgical engineering under the supervision of Martin Brabers from the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium, in 1972.[9] Qadeer Khan's doctoral dissertations were written in fluent German.[9] His doctoral thesis dealt and contained the fundamental work in martensite, and its extended industrial applications to the field of Morphology, a field that studies the shape, size, texture and phase distribution of physical objects[9][10]

Research in Europe

In 1972, the year he received his doctorate, Abdul Qadeer Khan through a former university classmate, and a recommendation from his old professor and mentor, Martin J. Brabers, joined the senior staff of the Physics Dynamics Research Laboratory in Amsterdam.[11] There, he began his studies on the high-strength metals to be used for the development of gas centrifuges.[12] The gas centrifuges were first studied by Jesse Beams during the Manhattan Project in 1940s but research was discontinued in 1944. The Physics Laboratory was a subcontractor for URENCO Group, the uranium enrichment research facility at Almelo, Netherlands, which was established in 1970 by the Netherlands to assure a supply of enriched uranium for nuclear power plants in the Netherlands.[11] Soon when the URENCO Group offered him to join the senior scientific staff there, Qadeer Khan left the Physics Laboratories.[11] There, he was tasked to perform physics experiments on uranium metallurgy,[11] to produce commercial-grade uranium metals usable for light water reactors.[11] In the meantime, the URENCO Group handed him the drawings of centrifuges for the mathematical solution of the physics problems in the gas centrifuges.[11] Uranium enrichment is a difficult physical process, as 235U exists in natural uranium at a concentration of only 0.7%; the Urenco used Zippe-type centrifuges for that purpose to separate the isotopes 235U from non-fissile 238U by spinning UF6 gas at up to 100,000RPM.[11] Abdul Qadeer Khan's academic and leading-edge research in metallurgy brought great laurels to URENCO Group.[11] The Urenco enjoyed a great academic relationship with him, and had him as one of its most senior scientists at the facility where he researched and studied.[11] At URENCO, Abdul Qadeer Khan pioneering research to improve the efficiency of the centrifuges greatly contributed to the technological advancement of the Zippe centrifuges, a method that was developed by mechanical engineer Gernot Zippe in the Soviet Union during the 1940s.[11] URENCO granted Qadeer Khan access to the most restricted areas of its facility as well as to the most restricted and highly classified documentation on gas centrifuge technology.[11]

1971 war and return to Pakistan

The clandestine and highly secretive atomic bomb project of Pakistan was given a start on 20 January 1972, when President (later Prime minister) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto chaired a secret meeting of academic scientists at Multan.[13] The winter planning seminar known as Multan meeting, the atomic bomb project was launched under the administrative control of Bhutto, and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (or PAEC) under its chairman, Munir Ahmad Khan.[13] Earlier efforts were directed towards the implosion-type bomb with exploration of the Plutonium route.[13] Prior to 1974, he had no knowledge of existence of country's integrated atomic development, a controversy that highly doubts Abdul Qadeer Khan's "father-like" claim. It was only on 18 May 1974, when he was alerted after India surprised the world with its first nuclear test (codename: Smiling Buddha), near Pakistan's eastern border under the secret directives of Indian Premier Indira Gandhi.[13] Conducted by the Indian Army, it was only three years since Pakistan's humiliating defeat in the 1971 Winter war and the outcomes of the war had put Pakistan's mortal existence in great danger.[14] This nuclear test greatly alarmed the Government of Pakistan and the people.[13] Prime minister Zulfikar Bhutto squeezed the time limit of the atomic bomb project from five years to three years, in a vision to evolved and derived the country's scientific atomic project as from the "atomic capability to sustainable nuclear power".[13] Sensing the importance of this test, Munir Ahmad Khan secretly launched the Project-706, a codename of a secret uranium enrichment programme under the domain of the atomic project.[13]

After reading the local newspaper, he wanted to contribute in the post-war efforts and approached to Pakistan government officials where he offered to assist in Pakistan's secret atomic bomb project.[15] He insisted to joining the atomic bomb project[16] but was disuated by the military scientists who quoted as "hard to find" a job in PAEC as a "metallurgist".[15]

Undaunted, he wrote to Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, highlighting his experience and encouraged Prime Minister Bhutto to make an atomic bomb using uranium.[15] According to Kuldip Nayyar, although the letter was received by Prime minister Secretariat, Qadeer Khan was still unknown to the Government, leading Bhutto to ask the ISI to run a complete background check on Khan and prepare an assessment report on Khan and his profession.[17] The ISI recommended him as an "incompetent" in the field of nuclear technology based on his academic discipline.[17] Unsatisfied with ISI's report, Bhutto was much more eager to know about him, therefore Bhutto asked Munir Ahmad Khan to dispatch a team of PAEC's scientists to meet him.[18] The PAEC team compromising Sultan Mahmood traveled to Amsterdam and arrived where Qadeer Khan was staying with his family at night and the discussion was held until the next day.[18] After the team return to Pakistan, Bhutto immediately decided to meet with Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, and directed a confidential letter to him. Soon after, Abdul Qadeer Khan took a leave from URENCO Group, and departed for Pakistan in 1974.[18]

Initiation and atomic bomb project

In December 1974, Abdul Qadeer Khan went to Pakistan and taxied to Prime minister Secretariat without even stopping at the local hotel.[19] The session was held at midnight and remained under extreme secrecy with only few knowing about it.[19] There, Qadeer Khan met with Zulfikar Bhutto, Munir Khan, and Dr. Mübaschir Hassan, government Science Adviser.[19] At this session, he enlightened the importance of uranium as oppose to plutonium, but Bhutto remain unconvinced to adopt uranium against the plutonium for the development of an atomic bomb.[19] Bhutto ended the session quick and Qadeer Khan took off from the Prime minister secretariat, Zulfikar Bhutto quietly quoted to his friends that: "He seems to make sense."[19] Next day early morning, another session was held where he diverted discussion on uranium against the plutonium, with other PAEC officials were also presented.[16] Even though he initially explained to Bhutto why he thought the idea of "plutonium" would not work, Qadeer Khan was fascinated by the possibility of atomic bomb and was quickly bored with the idea of "just" plutonium.[16] Many of the theorists at that time, including Munir Khan maintained that "plutonium and the nuclear fuel cycle has its significance",[14] and Munir Khan insisted that with the "French extraction plant in the offing, Pakistan should stick with its original plan."[14] Bhutto did not disagree, but saw the advantage of mounting a parallel effort toward HEU fuel.[14][20] At this final session with Zulfikar Bhutto, Qadeer Khan also advocated for the development of a fused design to compress the single fission element in the metalized gun-type atomic device, which many of his fellow theorists said would be unlikely to work.[16][21]

Finally in 1976, he joined the atomic bomb project, and became part of the enrichment division at PAEC.[19] Calculations performed by him were valuable contributions to centrifuges and vital link to bomb research.[13] He continued to push his ideas for uranium methods even though it had been a secondary and low priority, with most efforts applied to produce military-grade plutonium.[19] Because of his interest in uranium, and his frustration at having been passed over for director of the uranium division (the job was instead given to Bashiruddin Mahmood), Qadeer Khan refused to engage in the calculations and caused tensions with other researchers as the pair disagreed.[19] He became highly unsatisfied and bored with the research led by Mahmood; finally, he submitted an unduly pessimist report to Bhutto, in which he explained that the "enrichment programme" was no near success.[19]

Kahuta Research Laboratories

Bhutto sensed great danger as the scientists were split between uranium and plutonium routes.[19] Therefore, Bhutto called him for a meeting, which was held at the prime minister secretariat. With the backing of Bhutto, Qadeer Khan took over the enrichment programme and renamed the project to Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL).[19] Abdul Qadeer Khan insisted to work with the Corps of Engineers to lead the construction of the suitable operational enrichment site, which was granted. The E-in-C directed Brigadier Zahid Ali Akbar of Corps of Engineers to work with Qadeer Khan in Project-706.[19] The Corps of Engineers and Brigadier Akbar quick acquired the remote city of Kahuta which had prestige of having being the dangerous mountainous area.[22] The military realized the seriousness of the atomic experiments being performed in populated places therefore, Kahuta was an ideal and optimum location for physics experiments.[22] Bhutto would later Brigadier Zahid Akbar to Major-General and handed over the directorship of the Project-706, with Qadeer Khan being its senior scientist.[23]

On the other hand, the PAEC did not forgo the electromagnetic isotope separation and a parallel programme was being directed by theoretical physicist Dr. G.D. Allam at Air Research Laboratories (ARL) located at Chaklala PAF base, though G.D. Allam had not seen a centrifuge, but only had a rudimentary knowledge of the Manhattan Project.[24]

At first, the ERL suffered many setbacks, and heavily relied upon on the foreign assistance brought by Qadeer Khan.[24] Meanwhile in April 1976, theorist Ghulam Dastigar Alam accomplished great feat by successfully rotating the first generation centrifuges to ~30,000 RPM.[24] When the news were reached to Qadeer Khan, he immediately requested to Bhutto for G.D. Alam's assistance which was granted by the PAEC, first dispatching the team of scientists including G.D. Alam to ERL.[24] At ERL, Qadeer Khan joined the team of theoretical physicists headed by theorist dr. GD Allam, working on the physics problems involving the differential equations in the centripetal forces and angular momentum calculations in the ultra-centrifuges.[24] On 4 June 1978, the enrichment programme became fully functional after Dr. G.D. Alam succeeded in separated the 235U and 238U isotopes in an important physics experiment which Dr. A.Q Khan was also took part in and witnessed.[24][25] On contrary to his high expectation, the military instead approved to appointment of Major-General Zahid Ali as the scientific director of entire uranium division.[24]

In 1981, when General Akbar was posted back to combat assignments, he took over the operations of ERL as its interim director and senior scientist.[22][23] In 1983, Abdul Qadeer Khan's appointment as director of ERL was personally approved by President Zia-ul-Haq and rename the ERL after his name, in conjunction to his honour.[26]

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan is being honoured by President Farooq Leghari, 1996.

Despite his initiation and significance, Qadeer Khan was never in charge of the actual development of atomic bombs, mathematical and physics calculations, and eventual weapons testing.[26] The outgoing General Zahid recommended Munir Khan appointment as the scientific director of atomic bomb project. This appointment came as a shock and surprised many in the government and the military as Munir Khan was not known to be aligned to conservative military.[24][26][27] The government itself restricted to provide full scientific data of atomic projects and had him required the government security clearance and clarifications of his visits of such secret weapons development sites, which he would be visiting with senior active duty officers.[27]

In 1984, the KRL claimed to carry out its own nuclear cold test of a weapon, but this was seemed to be unsuccessful as PAEC under Munir Khan had already carried out the test in 1983, codename: Kirana-I.[28]

The PAEC's senior scientist who worked with him and under him, remember him as "an egomaniacal lightweight"[26] given to exaggerating his scientific achievements in centrifuges.[26] At one point, Munir Khan once said that, "most of the scientists who work on the development of atomic bomb projects were extremely "serious". They were sobered by the weight of what they don't know; Abdul Qadeer Khan is a showman."[26] During the timeline of atomic bomb project, Qadeer Khan pushed his research into rigorous theoretical physics calculations and topics to compete, but yet failed to impress his fellow theorists at PAEC, generally at the physics community. Later in years, Abdul Qadeer Khan had became a staunch critic of Munir Ahmad Khan's research in physics, and on many different occasions, he had tried unsuccessfully to remove Munir Khan's role in the atomic bomb projects. Their scientific rivalry became common and widely popular in the physics community and seminars held in the country over the years.[14]

Uranium tests: Chagai-I

Many of his theorists were unsure that gaseous uranium would be feasible on time without the centrifuges, since Alam had notified to PAEC that the "blueprints were incomplete" and "lacked the scientific information needed even for the basic gas-centrifuges."[29] However, calculations by the Tasneem Shah, confirmation by Alam, showed that possibility of improvise transformation of different centrifugal methods.[29] Against the popular perception, the URENCO's blueprints were based on civilian reactor technology; the blueprints were filled with serious technical errors.[13] Its SWU rate was extremely low that it would have to be rotated for thousands RPMs on the cost of taxpayer's millions of dollars, Allam maintained.[30] Calculations and innovation comes from the team compromising his fellow theorists, contained mathematicians Tasnim Shah and others, headed by theorist G.D. Alam, who solved the centrifugal problems and developed powerful versions of the centrifuges.[29] Scientists have claimed that Qadeer Khan would have never gotten any closer without the assistance of Alam and others.[29][31] The issue is controversial;[24] Qadeer Khan maintain to his biographer that when it came to defending that "centrifuge method" paper and really putting work into it, both Shah and Alam refused.[24]

The rivalry between KRL and PAEC became highly intensified when neighboring India conduct a series of tests of its nuclear bombs, codename Pokhran-II, in 1998 under the Indian Army. Following the tests, it triggered a great alarm and calls for its own tests were made by country's influential political sphere. Nawaz Sharif, Prime minister at that time, came under intense media and public pressure to finally authorise the nuclear testing programme.[28] After the Indian nuclear weapons tests, Abdul Qadeer Khan repeatedly met with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, trying for permission to test the atomic bombs in Chagai.[28] At the meeting, he maintained to the idea that the tests could by performed at the controlled test site in Kahuta. But it was rebuffed by the government, and instead ordered PAEC, under Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad, to perform tests in Chagai due to their experience of ingeniously performing the tests in the past.[28] When the news reached to him, furious Qadeer Khan was badly upset and frustrated with the Prime minister.[28] Without wasting a minute, Qadeer Khan drove to Joint Staff Headquarters where he met with chairman joint chiefs General Jehängir Karamat, where he lodged a strong protest and grievousness to the chairman joint chiefs. General Karamat then called the Prime minister, and decided that KRL scientists, including Qadeer Khan, would also be involved in the test preparations and present at the time of testing alongside those of the PAEC.[28] It was the KRL's HEU that ultimately led to the successful detonation of Pakistan's first nuclear devices on 28 May 1998, under codename Chagai-I.[25] Two days later, on 30 May, a small team of scientists belonging to PAEC, under the leadership of Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, a plutonium nuclear device, codename Chagai-II.[32] The sum of forces and yields produced by devices were around ~40.0kt of nuclear force, with the largest weapon producing around 35–36kn of force. In contrast, the single plutonium device had produced the yield of ~20.0kt of nuclear force and had much more bigger impact as compared to uranium devices.[32]

Many of Qadeer Khan's colleagues were irritated that he seemed to enjoy taking full credit for something he had only a part in.[29] He made an attempt to work on the Teller design for the hydrogen bomb, but PAEC had objected the idea as it went against government policy.[16][24][33] Abdul Qadeer Khan was known for enjoying taking full credit of something he had done a part in, and often getting engrossed in projects which were theoretically interesting but practically unfeasible.[13][34]

Proliferation of URENCO technology

Abdul Qadeer Khan then established a network through Dubai to smuggle URENCO technology to Engineering Research Laboratories.[25][35][36][37] In the 1980s, the reports on negotiation between People's Republic of China and Pakistan for the sale of (UF6) and HEU fuel were surfaced in the media.[38] Reports alleged that "A.Q. Khan had paid a visit to China to provide technical support in their nuclear program whilst aided in building the centrifuge facility in Hanzhong province.[38] The Chinese government offered back the nuclear material, but Pakistan refused, calling it a "gift of gesture" to China.[38] According to the independent IISS report, Zia had given a "free hand" to Qadeer Khan and given autonomous import and export access to him. The report showed that his acquisition activities were largely unsupervised by Pakistan governmental authorities; his activities went undetected for several years.[39]

Court controversy and U.S. objections

The scientific activities rapidly attracted the attention of the outside world and quickly suspected outside assistance. Though, it was dismissed and suspicions soon fell on Qadeer Khan's knowledge obtained in URENCO Group.[40] In 1983, Qadeer Khan was sentenced in absentia to four years in prison by the local court in Amsterdam for attempted espionage.[40] When the news reached to Pakistan, Barrister SM Zafar immediately traveled to Amsterdam and filed a petition at the Court.[40] Zafar teamed up with Qadeer Khan's old mentor professor Martin Brabers and his Leuven University to prepare evidences for the case.[40] At the trial, Zafar and Martin argued that the technical informations taken by Qadeer Khan are commonly found and taught in undergraduate and doctoral physics at the university.[26] After series of hearing, the sentence was later overturned on appeal on a legal technicality by the Court.[26] Reacting on the case, Qadeer Khan stated: "I had requested for it as we had no library of our own at KRL, at that time".[26] He strongly rejected any suggestion that Pakistan proliferation attempts and quoted: "All the research work [at Kahuta] was the result of our innovation and struggle. We did not receive any technical "know-how" from abroad, but we cannot reject the use of books, magazines, and research papers in this connection."[26]

In a local interview given in 1987 , he stated that: "U.S. had been well aware of success of atomic quest of Pakistan."[41] Allegedly confirming the speculation, the Pakistan Government sharply denied all claims made by Qadeer Khan. Following this, Qadeer Khan was summoned for a quick meeting with President Zia-ul-Haq, who used a "tough tone" and strongly urged Qadeer Khan to cease any information "he'd been providing in statements, promising severe repercussions if he continued to leak harmful information against the Pakistan Government."[41] Immediately, he made several contacts with foreign newspapers, denying any and all statements he had previously released.[41] After U.S. terminating major aid to Pakistan, Benazir government reached an understanding with the United States to "freeze" and "capped" the program to LEU which is up to 3–5%. Later, the program was restored back to 90% HEU in 1990, and on July 1996, he maintained, "at no stage was the program of producing 90% weapons-grade enriched uranium ever stopped".[41]

North Korea, Iran and Libya

In 2003, Libya gave up the weapons-related material including the gas-ultra centrifuges. These gas-ultra centrifuges were marked as early models that Abdul Qadeer Khan developed in 1980s, known as PakSat-I.[42]

The defense treaty between Pakistan and North Korea was signed in 1990 after Benazir Bhutto, Prime minister at that time paid a state visit to the communist regime. The diplomatic relations with Communist Korea were established during the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's period, a socialist democratic period in Pakistan.[43] In 1990, it was reported that the highly sensitive centrifuge technology was being exported to North Korea in exchange for missile technologies.[43] On multiple occasions, Qadeer Khan had alleged that, Benazir Bhutto had "issued clear direction" for that matter. In 1993, the downloaded secret information on uranium enrichment was delivered to North Korea in exchange for information on developing ballistic missiles.[39]

In 1987, Iran wanted to purchase a fuel-cycle technology from Pakistan, but it was rebuffed.[39] Zia calculated that the civil nuclear cooperation with Iran was purely a "civil matter" and maintaining good relations with Tehran.[39] Zia did not further approve any nuclear deals, but Qadeer Khan secretively handed over the sensitive report on centrifuges in 1987–89.[39] It was in 2003 that the nature of such agreement was made public[43] The Iranian government came under intense pressure from the Western world to fully disclose its nuclear program; the country agreed to accept tougher inspections from the IAEA.[43] The IAEA inspection showed that Iran had established a large uranium enrichment facility using gas centrifuges based on the URENCO designs, which had been obtained "from a foreign intermediary in 1989".[43] The intermediary was not named but many diplomats and analysts pointed to Qadeer Khan.[43] The Iranians turned over the names of their suppliers and the international inspectors quickly identified the Iranian gas centrifuges as Pak-1's, the gas centrifuges invented by Qadeer Khan during the atomic bomb projects.[43]

In 2003, the IAEA successfully dismantled Libya's nuclear program after persuading Libya to roll back its program in order to have the economic sanctions uplifted.[43] The Libyan officials turned over the names of its suppliers which also included Qadeer Khan.[43] The same year, the Bush administration launched its investigation on Qadeer Khan's leak in 2001 and 2002, focusing on Qadeer Khan's personal role.[43]

Dismantlement and revelation

The Libyan government officials were quoted as saying that "Libya had bought nuclear components from various black market dealers, including Pakistan's".[43] The U.S. officials who visited the Libyan plants reported that the gas centrifuges were very similar to the Pak-1 centrifuges of Iran.[43] By the time the evidences against Qadeer Khan had surfaced, he had become a public icon in the country and was the Science Adviser to the Government.[43] His vigorous advocacy for atom bombs and missiles became an embarrassment to the Pakistan government.[43] On 31 January 2004, Qadeer Khan was suddenly dismissed from his post, and the government launched a full-fledged investigation on Qadeer Khan to ostensibly "allow a fair investigation" of the allegations.[43] The Wall Street Journal quoted unnamed "senior Pakistan government officials" as conceding that Qadeer Khan's dismissal from KRL had been prompted by the U.S. government's suspicions.[43] On 4 February 2004, Qadeer Khan appeared on state-owned media Pakistan Television (PTV) and confessed to running a proliferation ring, and admitted to transferring technology to Iran between 1989 and 1991, to North Korea and Libya between 1991 and 1997.[44][45]

Although not arrested, the national security hearings were launched by the joint law officers from JAG Branch.[43] The debriefings also implicated the role of the former chief of army staff general Mirza Beg.[43] The Wall Street Journal quoted U.S. government officials as saying that Qadeer Khan had told the military lawyers that "General Beg had authorized the transfers to Iran."[46] According to IISS reports, Qadeer Khan for several years, had security clearance over import and export operations which were largely unsupervised and undetected.[39] Since 1970s, Abdul Qadeer Khan's security was tightly bounded, while he never travelled alone, he was accompanied by the secret members of the military establishment.[26]

Pardon, IAEA calls, and aftermath

On 5 February 2004, President Musharraf pardoned him as he feared that this issue would be politicized by his rivals.[47] The constitution of Pakistan allows the President of Pakistan to issue presidential pardons.[47] The hearings of Qadeer Khan badly damaged the political credibility of President Musharraf and the image of the United States. While, the Pakistan media aired sympathised documentaries, the political parties on other hand, used that issue politically to bring down the Presidency of Musharraf. The U.S. Embassy had pointed out that the successor of Musharraf would be less friendly towards the United States; this refrained United States from applying further direct pressure on Musharraf due to a strategic calculation that may led the loss of Musharraf as an ally.

A series of strong calls were made by many senior IAEA officials, U.S. and European Commission politicians, for Abdul Qadeer Khan available for interrogation by IAEA investigators, given lingering scepticism about the disclosures made by Pakistan regarding Qadeer Khan's activities. All requests were strongly dismissed by the Prime minister Shaukat Aziz and the government of Pakistan, terming it as "Case closed".

In December 2006, the WMDC headed by Hans Blix, a former IAEA chief and UNMOVIC chief; said in a report that Abdul Qadeer Khan could not have acted alone "without the awareness of the Pakistan Government".[48] Blix's statement was also reciprocated by the United States government, with one anonymous American government intelligence official quoting to independent journalist and author Seymour Hersh: "Suppose if Edward Teller had suddenly decided to spread nuclear technology around the world. Could he really do that without the American government knowing?".[49]

In 2007, the hearings were suspended when Musharraf was succeeded by General Ashfaq Pervez Kiani as chief of army staff.[3] Officially, all security hearings were terminated by the Chairman Joint Chiefs General Tärik Majid on November 2008.[3] Abdul Qadeer Khan was never charged with espionage activities nor any criminal charges were pressed against him.[3] The military maintained that the debriefings were the process of questioning Qadeer Khan to learn and dismantle the atomic ring.[3] The details of debriefings were marked as "classified" and were quickly wrapped up quietly following the fall of General Pervez Musharraf.[3]

In 2008, in an interview, Qadeer Khan laid the whole blame on President Musharraf, and noting Musharraf as "Big Boss" for proliferation deals. In 2012, Qadeer Khan later involved Benazir Bhutto in the proliferation matters, pointing out to the fact as she had issued "clear directions in thi[s] regard." Domestically and globally, it is generally believed that Qadeer Khan was made scapegoat by President Musharraf to prove his uttermost loyalty to the West whose support was urgently and desperately needed for the survival of his presidency.[49] It was done so to protect the names of those high-ranking military officials and civilian politicians, under whom Musharraf served in the past.[49]

Government work and political advocacy

Despite his controversies, Qadeer Khan was commuted by much of the scientific community, but was still quite welcome in the military science circles. In 2001, Musharraf awarded promotion to Abdul Qadeer Khan as the principle Science Adviser to the President.[43]

Abdul Qadeer Khan remains extremely populous figure and public saw him as national hero of Pakistan. Science in Pakistan served as Pakistan's extreme national pride, and his long association with science bought Khan a tremendous popularity.

The (meritorious) services of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan are "unforgettable" for our beloved country, Pakistan....
—Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz Shukat Aziz came to publicly support Abdul Qadeer Khan in 2007source[50]

On a television speech in 2007, Prime minister Aziz paid a huge tribute to Abdul Qadeer Khan and while commenting on last part of his speech, Aziz stressed it: "(...)....The services of (nuclear) scientist... Dr. (Abdul) Qadeer Khan are "unforgettable" for the country..(..)....".[50] In 2012, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan announced to form a political party Movement to Protect Pakistan.[51] In late 1980s, Abdul Qadeer Khan promoted the funding of the Pakistan's integrated space weapons project and vigorously supported, and supervised the Hatf-I and Ghauri-I program.[52]

Since his return to his homeland, Abdul Qadeer Khan elevated to became as country's top scientist[3] and involved in country's scientific programmes for more than two decades. His long association with science in Pakistan has brought Khan a great laurels and an extreme popularity in Pakistan. Khan secured the fellowship and the presidency of Pakistan Academy of Sciences, whose fellowship is highly restricted to scientists.[53] Through Pakistan Academy of Sciences, Khan published two books on metallurgy and material science.[54] Khan began to published his articles from KRL in 1980s, and began to organise conferences on Metallurgy by inviting materiel scientists from all over the world.[54] Gopal S. Upadhyaya, an Indian nuclear scientist and metallurgist as well, attended Khan's conference in 1980s and personally met him along with Kuldip Nayar.[54] In Upadhyaya's words, Khan was a proud Pakistani who wanted to show the world that he and scientists from Pakistan are no inferior to any one in the world.[54]

One of his notable contribution at the Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering Sciences and Technology when he served as the Project-Director of this university.[53] After the construction of institute was completed, Khan took the Professorship of Physics while also served as the Chairman of Department of Metallurgy and Materials Science at the Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering Sciences and Technology.[53] Later, Khan helped established the Dr. A. Q. Khan Institute of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering at the Karachi University.[53]


During his time in the atomic bomb project, he pioneered his research in the thermal quantum field and the condensed physics, while also co-authored articles in chemical reactions of the highly unstable isotopic particles in the controlled physical system.[55] He was also rumored in the media as Pakistan's own Dr. Strangelove (commonly referred to Edward Teller) in Stanley Kubrick's 1964 satirical film of the same name.[56] He maintains his stance to use of controversial technological solutions to both military and civilian problems, including the use of military technologies for the civilian welfare. Khan also remained a vigorous advocate for nuclear testing program and defence strength through nuclear weapons and the Pakistan's nuclear deterrence development as sparing his country the fate of Iraq or Libya.[57] In his recent interview, Abdul Qadeer Khan maintained that he has no regrets for what he did and maintained that:

[P]akistan's motivation for nuclear weapons arose from a need to prevent "nuclear blackmail" by India. Had Iraq and Libya been nuclear powers, they wouldn't have been destroyed in the way we have seen recently.... If (Pakistan) had [atomic] capability before 1971, we [Pakistanis] would not have lost half of our country after a disgraceful defeat.
—Abdul Qadeer Khan, statement on 16 May 2011, published the Newsweek[58]

Abdul Qadeer Khan faced heated and intense criticism from his fellow theorists whom he had worked with in the atomic bomb project, most notably theorist Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy.[59] In addition, Qadeer Khan's false claims that he was the "father" of the atomic bomb project since its inception and his personal attacks on Munir Khan caused even greater animosity by his fellow theorists, and most particularly, within the general physics community towards Qadeer Khan.[2][59] Due to public promotion by the Pakistan media, he remains one of the most known scientist in the country.[3] During his lifetime, he is the recipient of following honors:


Selected research papers and patents

Nuclear and Material physics


See also


  1. ^ In Pakistan, Dr. A.Q. Khan is referred to as a Prominent atomic scientist, and Mohsin-e-Pakistan (in Urdu: محسن پاکِستان; English Translation: Savior of Pakistan). His name can be spell in various ways. The Pakistan Academy of Sciences (PAS) spelled his name as Abdul Qaudeer Khan as well Islamic Academy of Science also spelled his name in same manner. Other educational organization spelled his name as Abdul Qadir Khan or Abdul Kadeer Khan. Alternative pronunciations for his name are Gaudeer or either Gadeer. On the other hand, Khan's birth certificate reads "Abdul Qadeer Khan".
  1. ^ "The Wrath of Khan – Magazine". The Atlantic. 4 February 2004. http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200511/aq-khan/2. Retrieved 2010-09-26.
  2. ^ a b (IISS), International Institute for Strategic Studies (2006). "Bhutto was father of Pakistan's Atom Bomb Programme". International Institute for Strategic Studies. http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2007/may-2007/bhutto-was-father-of-pakistani-bomb/?locale=en. Retrieved 2011.
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Bernstein, Jeremy (28 May 2009). "He Changed History". The New York Review of Books. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/apr/09/he-changed-history/. Retrieved 2011.
  4. ^ "Mush helped proliferate N-technology : AQ Khan". The Times of India. 6 July 2008. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2008-07-06/news/27723085_1_aq-khan-nuclear-proliferation-nuclear-technology.
  5. ^ http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/khan.htm
  6. ^ "IHC declares Dr A Q Khan a free citizen". GEO.tv. 6 February 2009. http://geo.tv/2-6-2009/34508.htm. Retrieved 2010-09-26.
  7. ^ Warrick, Joby Warrick (7 February 2009). "Nuclear Scientist A.Q. Khan Is Freed From House Arrest". The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/06/AR2009020603730.html. Retrieved 2011.
  8. ^ "Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, Founder and Ex-Chairman Dr. A Q Khan Research Laboratories". Pakistanileaders.com.pk. Archived from the original on 29 September 2010. http://www.pakistanileaders.com.pk/profile/Abdul_Qadeer_Khan. Retrieved 2010-09-26.
  9. ^ a b c d e f g h i "About Khan's education, achievements and research". Dr. A. Q. Khan. http://www.draqkhan.com.pk/about.htm.
  10. ^ Khan, Abdul Qadeer, The effect of morphology on the strength of copper-based martensites, Doctor of Engineering thesis under the supervision of Professor Martin J. Brabers, Faculty of Applied Sciences of the University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium, March 1972.
  11. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Rehman, Shahidur (May 1999) [1999], "§Dr. A. Q. Khan: Nothing Succeed like Success", Long Road to Chagai, Islamabad, Islamabad Capital Territory: Printwise Publications, p. 160, ISBN 969-8500-00-6
  12. ^ Khan's Achievements
  13. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Usman Shabbir (May 2004). "Remembering Unsung Heroes:§A.Q. Khan came on board". Pakistan Military Consortium and http://www.pakdef.info/. The Pakistan Military Consortium. http://www.pakdef.info/nuclear&missile/munirahmad1.html. Retrieved 2011.
  14. ^ a b c d e "The Wrath of Khan – Magazine". The Atlantic. 4 February 2004. http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200511/aq-khan/3. Retrieved 2010-09-26.
  15. ^ a b c History Commons (Updated). "Profile: Abdul Qadeer Khan". History Commons. http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=abdul_qadeer_khan.
  16. ^ a b c d e Khan, Feroz Hassan (November 7, 2012). "The clash of the Khans:Centrifuge Khan vs. Reactor Khan". Eating grass : the making of the atomic bomb. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. pp. 552. ISBN 978-0804776011.
  17. ^ a b Nayar, Kuldip. "Do not give importance to Dr. A.Q. Khan". Kuldip Nayar (only available in Urdu). Kuldip Nayar. http://criticalppp.com/archives/1425.
  18. ^ a b c Edward Nasim (23 July 2009). [Scientists of Pakistan "[with Sultan Bashir Mahmood]"]. Season 1. 0:30 minutes in. Nawai-e-Waqt Media Network (NWMT). Captail Studios. Scientists of Pakistan.
  19. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Causar Nyäzie (May 1994) [1994], "§9: The Reprocessing Plant—The Inside Story", [1994 Last days of Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto], 1, 1 (1 ed.), Islamabad, Islamabad Capital Territory: Maulana Causar Nyazie and Sani Panwjap, pp. 55–56, ISBN 969-8500-00-6, archived from the original on 2011, http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:wzM8bvjZK3MJ:www.bhutto.org/Acrobat/Last%2520Dayf%2520of%2520Premier%2520Bhutto.pdf+Last+days+of+Premier+Bhutto&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESjckwrTw4dvTbVQ2FEflsRU20aldSdvHTlXvKXEg4jkiZqdwZrD_yaOBO8SkqEM8Dv-f2TL8N6Tri_NNszXlQJ_35yornnzkagXTmrJvjakcy984S3LgbVKQUDXLgEm9WGwFCWf&sig=AHIEtbQ8JmT-OzGeBtHj-U1-gM8pY0SJPA
  20. ^ "Zulfikar Ali Bhutto". Historycommons.org. http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=zulfikar_ali_bhutto_1. Retrieved 2010-09-26.
  21. ^ Shabbir, Usman. "AQ Khan came on board.". Pakistan Defence Consortium (Journal). Pakistan Defence Consortium. http://www.pakdef.info/nuclear&missile/munirahmad1.html. Retrieved 18 October 2012.
  22. ^ a b c Khan, A. Qadeer (29 July 2009). "Bhutto, Zia-ul-Haq And Kahuta". A.Q. Khan. draqkhan.com. http://draqkhan.com.pk/index.php/2009/07/bhutto-zia-ul-haq-aur-kahuta/.
  23. ^ a b "A Science Odyssey: Pakistan's Nuclear Emergence". Samar Mubarakmand on AQ Khan. http://www.pakdef.info/nuclear&missile/science_odyssey.html. Retrieved 18 October 2012.
  24. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k [Shahid-ur-Rehman] (1999). "The Gas centrifuge controversy"". Long road to Chagai. Islamabad: Shahid-ur-Rehman, 1999. ISBN 969-8500-00-6..
  25. ^ a b c John Pike. "A.Q. Khan". Globalsecurity.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/khan.htm. Retrieved 2010-09-26.
  26. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Sublette, Carey; et. al (2 January 2002). "Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan". Nuclear Weapon Archives, Reuters and Los Angeles Times news reports were used in preparing this article.. Nuclear weapon archives. p. 1. http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/AQKhan.html. Retrieved 18 October 2012.
  27. ^ a b Hamid Mir (3 May 2004). "[Talk Special]". 1:00 minutes in. Geo Television Network. Geo Television Islamabad Studies.
  28. ^ a b c d e f Azam, Rai Muhammad Saleh (June 2000). "Where Mountains Move: The Story of Chagai: §Kirana-I". Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam. Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam, The Nation, Defence Journal, and the Pakistan Military Consortium. Archived from the original on 13 June 2011. http://www.pakdef.info/nuclear&missile/wheremountainsmove.html. Retrieved June 2011.
  29. ^ a b c d e "Dr. G D Alam Interview with Daily Asas". Daily Asas. http://www.pakdef.info/forum/showthread.php?12746-Dr.-G-D-Alam-Interview-with-Daily-Asas-and-Lashkar-1998.
  30. ^ (Rahman 1998, pp. 59–60)
  31. ^ (Rahman 1998, pp. 60)
  32. ^ a b Hoodbhoy, Pervez (2001). "Chagai-II: The Plutonium Bomb". Federation of American Scientists and Pakistan Atomic Scientists Foundation. Federation of American Scientists. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/. Retrieved 2011.
  33. ^ See: Project Hydrogen
  34. ^ "Interview of Dr. Samar Mubarak-Head of Pakistan Missile Programme". Hamid Mir. http://oraclesyndicate.twoday.net/stories/4167731/.
  35. ^ Armstrong, David; Joseph John Trento, National Security News Service. America and the Islamic Bomb: The Deadly Compromise. Steerforth Press, 2007. p. 165. ISBN 1-58642-137-9,9781586421373.
  36. ^ "Eye To Eye: An Islamic Bomb". CBS News. http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=3483035n&tag=mncol;lst;3.
  37. ^ "On the trail of the black market bombs". BBC News. 12 February 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3481499.stm.
  38. ^ a b c Kan, Shirley A. (2009). "§A.Q. Khan's nuclear network". China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy issues. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS): Congressional Research Service (CRS). pp. 5–6. ISBN Congressional Research Service (CRS).
  39. ^ a b c d e f IISS reports. "A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan". Copyright 2006 – 2012 The International Institute For Strategic Studies. The International Institute For Strategic Studies (IISS).
  40. ^ a b c d Khan, Abdul Qadeer (June 2010) [2010], "How we developed the programme" (in English and Urdu), Sehar Honay Tak (Until Sunrise), 1, 1, Islamabad, Pakistan:: Ali Masud books publication, p. 158, ISBN 969-8500-00-6
  41. ^ a b c d John Pike (16 May 2000). "Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL)". The Federation of American Scientists (John Pike). John Pike of Federation of American Scientists. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/facility/kahuta.htm. Retrieved 24 October 2012.
  42. ^ Libya Renounces Weapons of Mass Destruction
  43. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s Fitzpatrick, Mark (2007). "§Dr. A. Q. Khan and the rise and fall of proliferation network". Nuclear black markets. London, United Kingdom: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). ISBN 978-0-86079-201-7.
  44. ^ David Rohde and David Sanger, "Key Pakistani is Said to Admit Atom Transfers", The New York Times, 2 February 2004: A1.
  45. ^ I seek your pardon
  46. ^ John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, Musharraf Named in Nuclear Probe: Senior Pakistani Army Officers Were Aware of Technology Transfers, Scientist Says", The Washington Post, 3 February 2004.
  47. ^ a b Bill Powell and Tim McGirk, "The Man Who Sold the Bomb; How Pakistan's A.Q. Khan outwitted Western intelligence to build a global nuclear-smuggling ring that made the world a more dangerous place", Time Magazine, 14 February 2005, p. 22.
  48. ^ "A Q Khan did not act alone" says Hans Blix team
  49. ^ a b c Hersh, Seymour (March 1, 2004). "is Washington going easy on Pakistan’s nuclear black marketers?" (google docs). Work by Seymour Hersh, with the assistance from the US government.. The New Yorker. https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:zZeDVlZ07iQJ:asr2.myweb.uga.edu/Fall%25202004/Readings/The%2520Deal%2520Why%2520is%2520Washington%2520going%2520easy%2520on%2520Pakistan.doc+edward+teller+a+q+khan&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESimG6b18jM13DAC4Cm54gVWkHHd-hn2mcIuBh2Ta0-dN1tCUfkNWqtoYFwFYDeDe_fq_prhYeNU4lrqI_1PWjE_ZuOuScloinPIn3RWy0gx7E0VONY62B5MkW7V191EH-UGSHSU&sig=AHIEtbR-G3K5Lw2ONst7nEmB_StqiUzljg. Retrieved 9 December 2012.
  50. ^ a b APP, APP (26 October 2007). "Dr. Qadeer's services unforgettable, says PM Shaukat Aziz". Pakistan Tribune, 26 October 2007. http://paktribune.com/news/Dr-Qadeers-services-unforgettable-says-PM-Shaukat-Aziz-192877.html. Retrieved 30 May 2012. "The services of Nuclear Scientist Dr. Qadeer Khan are unforgettable for the country; we will not hand him over to any other country..."
  51. ^ Gishkor, Zahid (27 August 2012). "AQ Khan set to launch own political party". The Tribune Express. http://tribune.com.pk/story/426738/aq-khan-set-to-launch-own-political-party/#comment-885355. Retrieved 18 October 2012.
  52. ^ "The past and the present (12-Nov-2008)". A. Q. Khan. http://draqkhan.com.pk/index.php/2008/11/the-past-and-the-present-12-nov-2008/#more-3. Retrieved 2010-09-26.
  53. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Pask. "Abdul Qadeer Khan". Press Directorate Office of the Pakistan Academy of Sciences. Pakistan Academy of Sciences. http://www.paspk.org/detail.php?id=16&id1=124. Retrieved 18 October 2012.
  54. ^ a b c d Upadhyaya, Gopal S. (2011). "§Dr. A.Q. Khan of Pakistan". Men of Metals and Materials: My Memoires. Bloomington, Indiana, United States: iUniverse.com. p. 248pp. ISBN 969-8500-00-6.
  55. ^ a b "Frontiers in Physics". 13 December 1988. Proceedings of the Second National Symposium on Frontiners in Physics. http://pps-pak.org/proceedings/Second-Proc-1988.pdf. Retrieved 16 January 2012.
  56. ^ Harrison, Selig S. (Thursday, January 31, 2008). "Pakistan's Dr. Strangelove". The New York TImes. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/30/AR2008013003214.html. Retrieved 2 February 2013.
  57. ^ GEO TV (17 May 2011). "Nuclear capability saved Pakistan". Geo Television Network (GTN). GEO News (GNews). http://www.geo.tv/5-17-2011/81448.htm. Retrieved 8 December 2011.
  58. ^ Khan, Abdul Qadeer. "I saved my country from nuclear blackmail’". Newsweek; The Tribune; The NTI; various others. http://tribune.com.pk/story/170253/i-saved-my-country-from-nuclear-blackmail/. Retrieved 3 December 2011.
  59. ^ a b Hoodbhoy, Pervez (4 May 1999). "Bombs, Missiles and Pakistani Science: The Chaghi tests, and more recent Ghauri-II and Shaheen-I missile launches, have been deemed heroic symbols of high scientific achievement... Are they?". Chowk.com. http://www.chowk.com/Views/Science/Bombs-Missiles-and-Pakistani-Science. Retrieved 2011.
  60. ^ Khan, Abdul Qadeer. "Islamic Academy of Sciences Fellowship members". Islamic Academy of Sciences. http://www.ias-worldwide.org/profiles/prof85.htm. Retrieved 1998.
  61. ^ Murtaza, Ghulam; Zhahour Ahmad (November (19–21) 1998). "Condense Matter Physics". Seven National Symposium on Frontiers in Physics. 7 7 (7): 2/3. http://pps-pak.org/proceedings/Seventh-Proc-1998.pdf. Retrieved 16 January 2012.


  • Khan, Abdul Qadeer (2010). "§Sehar Honay Tak: Dr. A.Q. Khan gave us the sense of security, Javed Hashmi.". In Khan, Abdul Qadeer. Sehar Honay Tak. Islamabad, Pakistan: Ali Masud books publication. pp. 1–158. ISBN 969-8500-00-6.
  • Upadhyaya, Gopal S. (2011). "§Dr. A.Q. Khan of Pakistan". Men of Metals and Materials: My Memoires. Bloomington, Indiana, United States: iUniverse.com. p. 248pp. ISBN 969-8500-00-6.
  • Rahman, Shahid (1998). "§Dr. A. Q. Khan: Nothing Succeed like Success". In Rahman, Shahid. Long Road to Chagai. Islamabad, Pakistan: Printwise publication. pp. 49–60. ISBN 969-8500-00-6.
  • Fitzpatrick, Mark (2007). "§Dr. A. Q. Khan and the rise and fall of proliferation network". Nuclear black markets. London, United Kingdom: International Institute for Strategic Studies. ISBN 978-0-86079-201-7.
  • Kan, Shirley A. (2009). "§A.Q. Khan's nuclear network". China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy issues. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS). pp. 5–6. ISBN Congressional Research Service (CRS).
  • (BIIP), Bureau of International Information Programs (2005). "§A.Q. Khan and the nuclear market". In Cooney, Thomas E.; Denny, David Anthony. E=mc²: Today's Nuclear Equation. Washington, DC: United States: Judith S. Seagal. pp. 1–40. ISBN United States Department of State.


External links

Atom diagram.png
Written by Abdul Qadeer Khan
Online Books
Government offices
Preceded by
Ishfaq Ahmad
Science Advisor to the Presidential Secretariat
1 January 2001 – 31 January 2004
Succeeded by
Atta ur Rahman